Eight Circuit follows Third Circuit's Exide in En Banc Review of Interstate Bakeries
Complex corporate transactions often include ancillary intellectual property licenses. For various reasons, when one company sells off part of its business operations it may not be able to transfer intellectual property rights to the acquiring entity. Usually, this is because the selling entity still needs to retain the IP rights for the operations it doesn't sell. The parties resolve the problem by licensing the IP to the divested portion of the business - usually these IP licenses are perpetual and fully paid. In intent, the licensee receives the rights to the IP within a particular scope - possibly geographical or perhaps in connection with a specific brand or product.
When the seller files a bankruptcy can it reject these ancillary IP licenses? What if, by so doing, it effectively unwinds a fully completed business divestiture? The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had to address this issue recently in the Interstate Bakeries Corporation case. The debtor had previously sold off several food brands as part of a business divestiture, but licensed the trademarks instead of assigning them. Now, the debtor sought to reject the trademark license - effectively unwinding the prior business transaction.
In the
Exide Technologies case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had faced a similar situation. It held that the trademark license was not executory because the parties had substantially performed the material provisions of the agreement when the prior business divestiture was completed. The remaining trademark license was thus substantially performed and non-executory. The debtor could not reject it.
The Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit
initially reached a different conclusion, even though on similar facts, holding that the remaining trademark license was executory. In distinguishing Exide, the Eight Circuit noted the existence of additional provisions requiring the licensor to continue to monitor the licensee's use of the marks. These provisions, the Court said, made the license executory.
On En Banc review,
the full Court of Appeals reversed. Following Exide, it reviewed the license agreement as part of an integrated sale agreement, which it held had been substantially performed. Along the way, the court discussed the concept of considering the IP license in context. The Court felt that the central purpose of the agreement was the sale of certain brands and related operations to the buyer - not a trademark license. The trademark license itself was an ancillary part of the transaction and, thus, the remaining unperformed terms were not material.
Labels: executory contract, Exide, Interstate Bakeries, trademark, trademark license
When is a Contract Not a Contract?
Simple answer - when it is really two contracts. In
Physiotherapy Holdings, Inc., the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware examined the issue of contract integration.
The debtor in this case faced an unusual dilemma. The court had affirmed its Chapter 11 plan, but it still needed to address an essential software license with Huron Consulting Services. The debtor absolutely needed the software to operate - at least for the six to nine months needed to switch to new systems. But, the software license was governed by a Master Agreement, which, among other terms, required the debtor to indemnify Huron against certain claims a litigation trust was planning to bring. If the debtor assumed the Master Agreement/Software License as an integrated contract, the reorganized debtor would have to insure Huron against the coming storm - a prohibitively expensive proposition. On the other hand, if the debtor rejected the contracts it would have to cease operations - since access to the software was essential. And, because the debtor's plan had been confirmed, no further delay was obtainable.
The debtor attempted the middle road. It asked for leave to assume the software license while rejecting the Master Agreement. Ordinarily, a debtor must assume or reject an executory contract in its entirety. The debtor may not assume the parts of a contract it wants, while rejecting the rest. The same rule applies when several agreements are designed to work together as an integrated contract. The debtor must reject or assume the integrated contract in its entirety.
The court closely examined the provisions of the Master Agreement and the license agreement. Executed as part of a single business arrangement, the Master Agreement terms governed, and were incorporated into, the license agreement. However, the court noted that at several places in the combined contracts provisions made clear that where the specific contract had provisions conflicting with the Master Agreement's terms, the specific agreement's terms would control. In particular, the Master Agreement contained broad indemnification provisions while the license agreement contained only a subset of the indemnifications' scope. By carefully reviewing the contracts' provisions, the Court was able to support a finding that the license agreement constituted a stand-alone agreement, even if some of its terms were derived from the Master Agreement. The debtor could assume the license agreement, while rejecting the Master Agreement.
Labels: assumption, executory contract